Prohealthlaw

9:02 PM

Spousal Immunity vs. Marital Privilege

SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
The rule forbidding one spouse to testify for or against the other is based on principles which are deemed important to preserve the marriage relation as one of full confidence and affection, and this is regarded as more important to the public welfare than that the exigencies of the lawsuits should authorize domestic peace to be disregarded for the sake of ferreting out facts within the knowledge of strangers.

Requisites in order for the spousal immunity to apply

That the spouse for or against whom the testimony is offered is a party to the case;
That the spouses are validly married;
The testimony is one that is offered during the existence of the marriage (Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 266, 2009 ed.); and
The case is not one of the exceptions provided in the rule. (Herrera, Vol. V, p. 302, 1999 ed.)

Kind of testimony is covered by the prohibition
The prohibition extends not only to testimony adverse to the spouse but also to a testimony in favor of the spouse. (Sec. 22, Rule 130; Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 265, 2009 ed.)

It does not apply in the case of estranged spouses, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed (Alvarez vs Ramirez, October 14, 2005)

Exceptions to the spousal immunity

In a civil case by one against the other; or
In a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants (Sec. 22), or
Where the testimony was made outside the marriage.

This can be waived just like any other objection to the competency of other witnesses. It can be waived through failure to interpose timely objection by calling the other spouse as a witness.

If an accused marries the prosecution witness for the sole purpose of sealing the lips of the witness, the prohibition may apply as long as a valid marriage exists at the time of the trial, the witness-spouse cannot be compelled to testify even where the crime charged is against the witness’ person, and even though the marriage was entered into for the express purpose of suppressing the testimony.

MARITAL PRIVILEGE
The marital privilege is a right that only legally married persons have in court. Also called the husband-wife privilege, it protects the privacy of communications between spouses. The privilege allows them to refuse to testify about communications they have privately exchanged as marital partners.

Requisites for the application of this privilege

There was a valid marriage;
The privilege is invoked with respect to a confidential communication between the spouses during the said marriage; and
The spouse against whom such evidence is being offered has not given his consent to such testimony. (Sec. 24, Rule 130)

The privilege is inapplicable

In a civil case by one against the other; or
In a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct ascendants or descendants.

Third persons who, without the knowledge of the spouses, overhear the communication are not disqualified to testify. Except when there is collusion and voluntary disclosure to a third party, that third party becomes an agent and cannot testify.

In United States v. Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182 (1915) the basis of the rule is said to be the "considerations of public policy growing out of the marital relation." Said the Court: "To allow one to testify for or against the other would be to subject him or her to great temptation to commit perjury and to endanger the harmony and confidence of the marital relation." On the other hand, in People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947), the Court gave as reasons for the privilege the following: "First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other."

To finally differentiate:

Spousal immunity can be invoked only if one of the spouses is a party to the action. While marital privilege can be claimed whether or not the other spouse is a party to the action.
Spousal immunity applies only if the marriage is existing at the time the testimony is offered. While marital privilege can be claimed even after the marriage is dissolved.
Spousal immunity constitutes an absolute prohibition for or against the spouse of the witness. While marital privilege applies only to confidential communications between the spouses.
In spousal immunity, the married witness would not be allowed to take the stand at all because of the disqualification. Even if the testimony is, for or against the objecting spouse. While in marital privilege, the married person is on the stand but the objection of privilege is raised when confidential marital communication is inquired into

The author takes no responsibility for the validity, correctness and result of this work. The information provided is not a legal advice and it should not be used as a substitute for a competent legal advice from a licensed lawyer. See the disclaimer

9:18 PM

Martial Law 101

The Requisites in proclaiming Martial Law

There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any part thereof.

The invasion and rebellion must be actual and not merely imminent.

The following cannot be done [Art. VII, Sec. 18]:

Suspend the operation of the Constitution.
Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies.
Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over civilians, where civil courts are able to function.

Open Court Doctrine — Civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil courts are open and functioning. If the civil courts are not functioning, then civilians can be tried by the military courts. Martial law usually contemplates a case where the courts are already closed and the civil institutions have already crumbled, i.e. a "theater of war." If the courts are still open, the President can just suspend the privilege and achieve the same effect.

Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President must suspend the privilege expressly.

A “writ of habeas corpus” is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer to inform the court if he has the person in custody, and what is his basis in detaining that person.

The “privilege of the writ” is that portion of the writ requiring the detaining officer to show cause why he should not be tested. What is permitted to be suspended by the President is not the writ itself but its privilege.

The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. (Sec. 13, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).

The Role of Congress (See art. VII, sec. 18, par. 1,2)

Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the lapse of 60 days from the date of suspension or proclamation.
Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shall convene at once. If it is not in session, it shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24 hours following the proclamation or suspension.
Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the suspension, the President shall submit a report, in person or in writing, to the Congress (meeting in joint session of the action he has taken).
The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute majority. It has two options:

To revoke such proclamation or suspension. When it so revoked, the President cannot set aside (or veto) the revocation as he normally would do in the case of bills.
To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity. Congress can only so extend the proclamation or suspension upon the initiative of the President.

The period need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Congress would determine, based on the persistence of the emergency.

The Role of the Supreme Court(See Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3)

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of:

the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or

The Supreme Court declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Hence, the suspension of the privilege of the writ is no longer a political question to be resolved solely by the President. (Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L‐33964, Dec. 11, 1971) This also applies to the proclamation of martial law.

the extension thereof. It must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.

Calling-out power is purely discretionary on the President; the Constitution does not explicitly provide for a judicial review of its factual basis.[IBP v. Zamora (2001)]

The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case.

Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President’s action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. [Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo (2012)]

Petition for habeas corpus

When a person is arrested without a warrant for complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else in his behalf has the standing to question the validity of the proclamation or suspension.
Before the SC can decide on the legality of his detention, it must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or suspension.

Limit on Calling out Power.

Test of Arbitrariness: The question is not whether the President or Congress acted correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact. [IBP v. Zamora, (2000)]. Amounts to a determination of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to ack or excess of jurisdiction

4 ways for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted: (P-C-S-O)

1. Lifting by the President himself

2. Revocation by Congress

3. Nullification by the Supreme Court

4. Operation of law after 60 days

When martial law is declared, no new powers are given to the President; no extension of arbitrary authority is recognized; no civil rights of individuals are suspended. The relation of the citizens to their State is unchanged. Supreme Court cannot rule upon the correctness of the President’s actions but only upon its arbitrariness.

RA 7055 (1991) "An Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy over the Military by Returning to the Civil Courts the Jurisdiction over Certain Offenses involving Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, other Persons Subject to Military Law, and the Members of the Philippine National Police, Repealing for the Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees"

RA 7055 effectively placed upon the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members of the AFP and other members subject to military law.

RA 7055 provides that when these individuals commit crimes or offenses penalized under the RPC, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, they shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected in which case it shall be tried by court-martial.

The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process. [Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34 (1987)]

5:20 AM

Feast of Divine Mercy 2017, El Salvador City

7:04 AM

Sumptuous Belly Buster Platter at Bigby's Cafe

7:47 PM

Saying "Putang Ina Mo" Is Not Really To Slander

This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prison correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."

At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.

The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.

On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 24, 1961.

DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS

City Fiscal

BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a whore."

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE

Complainant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.

(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.

From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment of the information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting petitioner of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only.

On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.

After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.

Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.

The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only.

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect."Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:

The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.

The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.

G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529, March 28, 1969

ROSAURO REYES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.: