Laws & Jurisprudence
Essential Elements Of Libel And Privileged Communication
10:21 PM
Petitioner
sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to House
Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio
Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion
of the first and second letters reads as follows:
This
is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS "DODONG"
C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not vested with any authority to liaison
or transact any business with any department, office, or bureau,
public or otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my office,
mandates or functions. x x x.
Note
worthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis "Dodong"
C. Almendras, a reknown blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just
concluded election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of my father,
the late Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain
to the family when he filed cases against us: his brothers and
sisters, and worst against his own mother.
I
deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person
and official functions is malicious in purpose, done with ill motive
and part of a larger plan of harassment activities to perforce
realise his egoistic and evil objectives.
May
I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the
above information to concerned officials and secretariat employees of
the House of Representatives.
x
x x x
These
letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published
by petitioner, assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del
Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to
destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras’ good name. Hence, the
latter filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation
against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19,
Digos City. The petitioner on the other hand, interposed the defense
of privileged communication.
In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence, except his Answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at his instance. The trial court thus submitted the case for decision, and eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial, but the same was denied by the trial court. On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this instant peition.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the
purview of privileged communication
RULING:
Petitioner’s
letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the purview of
privileged communication.
For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.
Consequently,
under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive
is shown. As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is
done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged
communication. In order to qualify as privileged communication under
Article 354, Number 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty
to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is
made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the
power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice.
In
determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain,
natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood
by the persons reading them, unless it appears that theywere used and
understood in another sense. In the instant case, the letters tag
respondent as a "reknown black mailer," a vengeful family
member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with
nefarious designs. Even an impartial mind reading these descriptions
would be led to entertain doubts on the person’s character, thereby
affecting that person’s reputation.
Malice
can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in
nature. Petitioner’s contention that he has the legal, moral or
social duty to make the communication cannot be countenanced because
he failed to communicate the statements only to the person or persons
who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have
the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the
statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be
classified asprivileged when it is published and circulated among the
public. Examination of the letters would reveal that petitioner
himself intended for the letters to be circulated (and they were so)
when he said that:
May
I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the
above information to concerned officials and secretariat employees of
the House of Representatives.
This
lack of selectivity on his part is indicative of malice and is
anathema to his claim of privileged communication because such
publication created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance
which brought discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.
Having
duly proved that all the elements of libel are present in this case,
petitioner should be liable for damages.
G.R.
No. 179491, January 14, 2015
ALEJANDRO
C. ALMENDRAS, JR., Petitioner, vs. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS,
Respondent.
SERENO,
CJ:
The author takes no responsibility for the validity, correctness and result of this work. The information provided is not a legal advice and it should not be used as a substitute for a competent legal advice from a licensed lawyer. See the disclaimer
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